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Abstract
This paper uses the proposed UK referendum on the single european currency as a means
of investigating the effect of democratising science on the scrutiny of conflicting expert
advice. The paper provides a brief overview of the main campaign issues before exploring
the organisation and campaign strategies of the main interest groups. The analysis shows
that key groups on both sides of the debate are anticipating a campaign in which the
political dimensions of the debate are actively minimised in order to avoid alienating the
key ‘floating voters’ upon which success in the referendum depends. As a result, the
campaign is expected to focus on the economic costs and benefits of the euro for
individuals and households, with only limited discussion of issues relating to sovereignty.
Whether or not the campaign groups, particularly those that oppose the euro can maintain
this line remains to be seen but if there is a full and frank public debate about the
economic, social and political stakes, then this will be despite the referendum rather than
because of it.
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3Introduction
‘Persuading people that adopting the euro is compatible with feeling British is still asking
them to change some of the emotional associations that they currently make with their
currency’1
If economics is a science, then the UK debate about whether or not to adopt the single
european currency is a case study in the public discussion of science. In particular, the
referendum and the preparations for it provide an opportunity to examine how decisions
that incorporate complex science and social life are taken in a context that is fully
politicised. The widening of participation in such decisions is usually taken to be an
improvement on elite or expert decision-making processes because it allows the
assumptions and values of expert groups to be challenged by those outside the policy-
circle. The social commitments and assumptions of scientists and other experts can be
revealed, and the boundaries between what is known and what is being assumed are
highlighted. In the case of the euro, as in so many other scientific domains from nuclear
power to BSE, these boundaries matter because most knowledge-claims remain contested,
so that what is known with any certainty is rather limited. In such a setting, the idea of a
more participatory process, in which democratic legitimacy adds to what can only be
minimal scientific authority, seems like a sensible proposal.
The single european currency provides an ideal lens through which to examine these
processes because a euro banknote is so much more that a piece of paper. On 1 January
2002, when the euro became legal tender in 12 EU member states, it was not just national
currencies that disappeared. National central banks and monetary policies formally
disappeared at the same time to be replaced by the European Central Bank and the
Council of Ministers. In turn, the creation of these new institutions gave political life to the
economic theories and knowledge that support the single market and its extension across
Europe. The creation of a new currency is thus also the creation of new institutions and
practices and its legitimacy as a currency depends in part on the legitimacy of the
institutions that regulate it.2 In this sense, the euro is like a new technology. It takes its
meanings from its place within a network of organisations and from the uses,
interpretations and evaluations given to it. When deciding how to vote in a euro
referendum, voters in the UK will be delivering a verdict on both a technical
understanding of the world and the capability of social institutions to bring that world into
being. Supporters of the euro need to have faith in both.
As a result, the debate about the euro temporarily prevents money from being an ‘abstract
system’ and foregrounds the previously taken-for-granted relations that enable a token
currency to function. In the case of the euro, the issues at stake involve judgements about
political sovereignty and accountability as well as judgements on economic questions such
as the competitive advantage gained by being inside or outside the euro. It is this
combination of national identity and economic science that make the prospect of a euro
referendum so interesting for social scientists and, particularly, those with interest in the
use of scientific expertise in policy decisions. Adopting the euro is not just a matter of
taste or preference it is also a matter of contested economic facts and forecasts and how to
proceed in the absence of certain knowledge about the consequences our actions. As a
result, the debate about the euro shares many characteristics with the familiar debates
about reflexive modernisation:
4 Any technical scientific criteria, such as the ‘five economic tests’ which the UK
must pass before the government will recommend joining the euro, are
controversial, uncertain and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.
 Both sides of the argument are supported by vocal interest groups, combining
political, commercial and scientific expertise and making the separation of the
science (i.e. the economics) from the politics impossible to sustain in practice.3
 The debate is not just about a technology (e.g. a more efficient mechanism for
making payments) but also about wider social identities and cultural values (e.g. are
the British also Europeans).
 The decision will have implications for almost all the citizens associated with each
side of the debate
Often investigated through environmental examples, such as new roads, airports or
nuclear power,4 the investigation of these controversies typically criticise expert
committees and public inquiries for being overly restrictive in their format, contributors or
terms of reference and suggest the need for more participatory and inclusive forms of
decision making.5 A wide range of case studies have shown how expert advice, and the
implicit social assumptions that underpin it, can be challenged and contradicted by other
experts6 and new concerns introduced. The discourse of stakeholders and democratising
science, as well as the current popularity of focus groups, consensus conferences and
stakeholder consultations all testify to the trend in this direction.7 Rarely, however, do
environmental disputes get put directly to the citizens, so the consequences of these
recommendations for decision-making remain speculative.
So where does this leave economic science, economic policy and the euro referendum? My
argument is that it places them at the very forefront of such participatory processes, and
that analysing the debate about the single european currency will reveal how abstract
claims about a broader, interdisciplinary public debate are translated in to real social action.
By examining how the debate is orchestrated, who contributes, and what sort of
arguments are used it will be possible to explore the future implications for other decisions
involving controversial science and, in particular, to ask whether there are limits beyond
which increased participation becomes counter-productive. In order to do this the paper
first sets out the key features of the relationship between science and the policy process in
the UK before considering the intellectual and social organisation of the euro debate in
more detail. The paper concludes by emphasising the ways in which the specific features
of the euro debate can be used to inform wider discussions about citizen participation in
science-based policy decisions.
Science and Policy: The UK Context
The relationship between scientists, policy-makers and the public in the UK has seen the
trends that characterise late or high modernity played out within a relatively centralised
institutional structure where the rationality and authority of science has been highly valued.
Thus the UK has typically relied on a system of expert committees and public inquiries
operating within specific terms of reference.8 This approach contrasts both with what
might be thought of as the US model, in which science-based policy decisions are usually
tested through the adversarial setting of the courtroom,9 and a more ‘European model’, in
which science-based policy decisions may include an element of citizen evaluation.10 Over
the last decade or so, public concerns about the UK’s decision-making processes have
grown, with the case of BSE/vCJD playing a particularly important role in crystallising the
opinion that something needed to change.
5The concept of reflexive modernisation forms the backdrop to these changes, capturing
the simultaneous loss of faith in traditional sources of authority, including scientific
authority, and the increasing individualisation fuelled by this disengagement from previous
forms of collective identity and solidarity. The consequences of this for the place of
scientific expertise in policy-making processes have been significant. Scientists have lost
their status as ‘impartial’ experts, with the result that their knowledge-claims are now
contested not just by other scientists but also by members of the public.11 Social
movements and protest groups have grown in number and credibility, with the increasing
use the ‘precautionary principle’ marking a change in the risk perceptions associated with
scientific and technological innovation. With its limits, uncertainties and consequences
recognised, scientific rationality is no longer the pre-eminent source of knowledge and
something of a crisis of legitimacy has resulted.12
As this public concern about the application of science and technology in a range of
domains has increased, official agencies have responded by increasing transparency,
accountability and dialogue within regulatory processes.13 As a result of consultations and
academic research it is now recognised that it is important to show that the full range of
views have been considered.14 In Beck’s work, this process would involve both intra-
scientific disagreement and intra-disciplinary scientific disagreement being encouraged to
take place in the public domain. Although formal political processes would orchestrate this
debate, and take action where appropriate, public evaluation of these debates also would
be possible.15 In practice, many of the recommendations and actions taken by the UK
government follow these recommendations, although it is arguable that, despite the wider
consultation, the same sort of people, using the same criteria of scientific rationality, still
retain a powerful voice in regulatory decision making.16
More radical proposals have also been put forward, however. In these the aim is usually to
move the locus of power away from formally recognised experts and to constitute new
decision-making institutions in which the uncertainty and risk associated with scientific
knowledge claims are acknowledged and traditionally ‘soft’ frames, such values and ethics,
play a more significant part. Perhaps the most optimistic of these participatory scenarios is
that painted by Functowicz and Ravetz in their vision of post-normal science, 17 in which
quality control decisions are taken by an extended peer community comprising researchers
and official experts and stakeholders with local knowledge. As they stress:
When problems lack neat solutions … when the phenomena themselves are
ambiguous, and when all research techniques are open to methodological criticism,
then the debates on quality are not enhanced by the exclusion of all but the
specialist researchers and official experts. The extension of the peer community is
then not merely an ethical or political act; it can positively enrich the process of
scientific investigation.18
Whilst this may seem a long way off, the developing notions of ‘context-sensitive
science’19 and the practice of Constructive Technology Assessment (CTA)20 can be seen as
practical steps in this direction. Even in the UK, concern with user-groups is pervasive and
the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee report recommends that:
… direct dialogue with the public should move from being an optional add-on to
science-based policy-making and to the activities of research organisations and
learned institutions, and should become a normal and integral part of the process.21
6The key difference between these proposals and the fora proposed by Beck and Giddens is
that this approach questions the extent to which a modernist rationality can ever bring all
relevant factors under its rubric. The implicit assumption of the reflexive modernity
theorists is that scientific-type rationality, albeit in a more reflexive form, can respond to
the risks modernity continually creates. The more radical alternatives, which typically grow
out of the sociology and philosophy of science, are much more sceptical about the
possibility of actually knowing this much or with such certainty. Their focus, therefore, is
on the ways in which judgements about socially acceptable levels of risk can (must) be
taken in the absence of robust and reliable knowledge about these very risks.22 In each
case, the resolution comes from broadening the grounds of the debate to include not just
more participants -- lay people as well as experts-- but also a wider range of evidence.
Values as well as facts now matter, with the importance of values increasing as the
certainty of facts decreases. Social knowledge and experience is therefore just as important
as science, and may even be given primacy over scientific knowledge if it can be
demonstrated that the social conditions needed for a technology to be ‘safe’ cannot be
sustained. Or, to put the same point, another way, what is needed is a more reflexive
policy-making process that allows for ‘debate of what values and socio-cultural identities
the possible technical options and commitments signify, reflect and reproduce’.23
The Euro Debate as (Reflexive?) Public Controversy
As noted above, the euro debate has many parallels with the science-based environmental
policy controversies that have achieved a high profile role in UK and European politics
and which are typically seen as visible manifestations of the ‘risk society’.24 If this analogy
between environmental and economic policy sciences holds, then the features that
characterise reflexive modernity ought to be present. For example, not only will the debate
about the euro be seen to involve an interdisciplinary concern with contested scientific
knowledge-claims, there will also be claims made about the nature of social institutions
and about the trustworthiness of different types of expert knowledge. Many of these
characteristics can also be found in contested sciences without the label reflexive, however,
and so the extent to which the UK’s euro debate becomes an example of reflexive
modernisation is an empirical question, that will only be fully answered once the
referendum campaign is over.
The potential for a reflexive process is certainly present, with the social institutions and
structures associated with the single currency debate matching those taken to characterise
reflexive modernisation. The key actors combine the same alliance of global capital (e.g.
multinational companies, investment banks, pension funds) and policy-makers concerned
to manage the social and economic costs of globalisation. Academically too the debate
conforms to the expected model. Complex technical models of macroeconomic policy and
management are needed, but disciplinary perspectives are also transcended as political
science, market research, business administration and psephology join macroeconomics in
the conduct of the campaign. If then introduction of the currency itself if included, then
an even wider range of law enforcement agencies, engineers, software specialists, retailers,
planners and logistics experts become relevant.
The reflexive turn comes not just from the interdisciplinary debate, but from the capacity
of that debate to increase public engagement with, and discussion about, the economic
and monetary policy choices that are made by governments and regulators. For example,
having prices denominated in the same currency across Europe will enable comparisons to
be made more easily by individuals, whilst simultaneously disembedding those individuals
from local or national markets. This might happen in many ways, such as the development
7of a European financial services industry, or the increased use of the internet to purchase
goods. More generally, the expectation might be that adopting the euro will increase
economic and labour market flexibility, with a rhetoric of lifelong learning,
entrepreneurship and mobility replacing older notions of class, occupation and stability.25
But there are also risks associated with the creation of large trading blocks as a response to
globalisation. In the case of the euro, these may revolve around the already emerging
concerns about employment security and the nature of work within this high-skill
economy. In particular, as trade and investment moves towards the most attractive
regions, so variations in income and opportunities may become magnified, leading to an
increasing regional inequality and social exclusion. While this paper does not aim to settle
this debate, one point is clear: given these stakes, concern with the euro may, at least for
the duration of the referendum campaign, provoke more public engagement with
economic policy, national and european governance, economic science and the world of
international finance. If this were to happen, then something like reflexive uncertainty
identified by Beck and Giddens would be being made visible.
It may never happen though. Although the euro debate has the potential to be read in this
reflexive way, it must also be acknowledged that, in many respects, economics and the
euro remain very modernist in nature. As a result, this potential engagement between the
public and the fundamental uncertainties associated with the economic rationality may be
swamped by an alternative modernist discourse that serves to retrench existing notions of
power, authority and control. It is important to note that this distinction between reflexive
and classical modernities does not map easily on to pro- and anti-euro campaigns. Rather,
the extent to which the reflexive potential of the debate is realised in practice is a reflection
of the wider culture within which both the pro- and anti- euro campaigns have to operate.
Both pro- and anti- euro groups are constrained by expectations and discourses about
economics that powerfully shape their own campaigns. For example, advocates of the euro
can (and do) stress its economic credentials and the way in which it brings increased
efficiency and transparency to economic markets. Couched in these terms the euro is
presented as a natural next step in the development of free trade and reinforces liberal and
capitalist ideologies dating from the nineteenth century. In other areas too, the euro
reinforces another characteristic of modernity: surveillance. Most obviously the
introduction of a single currency will make direct comparisons between workers, materials
and finished products in different areas more transparent and may lead to further
rationalisation (on economic competitiveness grounds) of social life and policies. Indeed,
the euro actually extends the scope of this surveillance to include the nation state by
creating new institutions to monitor economic indicators and impose penalties if the
criteria set out in the Maastricht Treaty are not adhered to.
It is impossible to predict at this stage whether the dominant modernist discourses of
efficiency and price transparency will, in practice, overwhelm any reflexive potential
created by the referendum and prevent public engagement with economic science and its
application. The recognition that a referendum, with its focus on participation and public
debate, is needed might be taken as an indicator of just such an increasing reflexivity and
the awareness that a rational basis for the decision (i.e. reliable and uncontroversial
knowledge) does not exist. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that it will be
conducted within a modernist framing in which economic discourse of costs and benefits
dominate.
8Potential Dimensions of the Debate
The euro debate has the potential to include a wide range of issues, but these arguments
can be summarised as addressing either the political or economic consequences of
adopting the single european currency. As a result, there are four basic claims, each of
which is summarised in the table below:
Table 1: Knowledge-Claims in the euro debate
Pro-euro Anti-euro
Political claim Adopting the euro will give the
UK government more
influence in monetary and
other relevant policy areas by
enabling it to take a leading
role in European institutions
Adopting the euro will give the
UK government less influence
in monetary and other relevant
policy areas by ceding power
to European institutions
Economic claim Adopting the euro will bring
benefits to the UK economy
by increasing economic
output, reducing costs and
increasing investment.
Adopting the euro will cause
damage to the UK economy
by decreasing economic
output, increasing regulation
and reducing investment
Economic and political arguments that fill each cell in the table exist. The problem is that
in no case have they been decisively one by either side. Thus there are eminent
economists, business leaders and politicians all sincerely believe that their interpretation of
the available data and evidence is right and that their opponents are wrong. This
interpretative flexibility is a normal part of any scientific or technical dispute and it is not
surprising that any economic or political factor that might be thought to benefit one side,
can also be turned around and used by the other. The following examples illustrate how
this interpretative flexibility manifests itself in the case of the single european currency in
order to show the potential for disagreement that exists and, by implication, the range of
issues that could be addressed in any referendum campaign.
Perhaps the most important of all the contested issues is the economic case for and against
the euro. On first sight, the economic case for joining, with its appeal to a common-sense
economic rationality, appears to favour the pro-euro case. For example, the claim that the
increasing economic growth and competitiveness are desirable is so taken-for-granted in
modern societies that it is difficult to see how it can be argued against. The argument is
not decisive, however, because the referendum is not about the principle of economic
efficiency, which all sides accept, but about the practice of organising a successful
economy in which employment and economic security are maximised. Once made
concrete like this, then it is far more difficult to claim unambiguously that either adopting
the euro or not adopting the euro promotes these goals. A selection of some of the more
common arguments, and the counter-arguments that negate them, are summarised in the
table below:26
9Table 2: Economic Arguments For and Against the Euro
Economic arguments for Economic arguments against
A single interest rate works in the US and will work
in Europe. While it is true that convergence between
the different areas that are covered by the single
currency is important, the evidence suggests that the
UK and European economies are converging.
A single interest rate works in the US but will not
work for the UK and Europe. This is because there
is insufficient convergence between the different
areas that would covered by the single currency; the
evidence suggests that the UK has more in common
with the US than the European economies.
Having prices denominated in the same currency
across Europe will facilitate comparisons and reduce
variations in prices through more competitive
markets.
A calculator is all that is required to compare prices.
Variations in prices across Europe are caused by
variations in regulations and introducing a single
currency will not alter this.
Europe is a major export market for the UK, so
having a stable exchange rate will make it easier for
UK businesses to import and export. Indeed, joining
the euro will increase access to these important
markets.
Europe may be a big market, but it is not the only
one. Half of UK trade is with economies outside the
euro. Fixing the exchange rate with Europe may
make it more difficult to trade with other nations
and offers no trading benefits as the UK is already a
member of the Single Market.
Because prices can be easily compared, this will tend
to drive prices and hence inflation down. Joining will
not be inflationary.
Adopting the same interest rate as the rest of Europe
will mean lowering UK interest rates and therefore
increasing inflation.
Not joining the euro will cost many British jobs as
British-based businesses become less competitive (as
a result of exchange rate uncertainty) and foreign
investors choose to locate elsewhere in Europe in
order to reduce transaction costs.
Joining the euro will cost many British jobs as a
result of a single European interest rate being the
wrong rate for the UK. In addition, these interest
rate problems would discourage foreign investment
rather than increase it by making trading conditions
more difficult.
Converting to the euro imposes some costs on
business but these will often involve replacing
equipment that had to be replaced anyway. In any
case, the savings created will recoup the costs in a
couple of years.
Converting to the euro will be very expensive for
businesses, which will have to buy new equipment
and systems. Any savings will be limited, as most UK
businesses have no international trade.
The Chancellor’s five economic tests ensure that the
UK will only hold a referendum if it is already clear
that joining is offers economic advantages.
The Chancellors five economic tests are too vague to
be interpreted with any clarity. What evidence there
is suggests they have not been passed, so joining is
not in the UK’s best interests.
In practice, therefore, economic arguments about the euro are wide-ranging but each claim
has its own counter-claim, so the outcome is often inconclusive. But it may be that
economic agreement is not necessary. Science always assumes a social context and it may
be the case that judgements about what sort of political institutions are needed are more
consensual. For example, although sovereignty may seem an abstract notion that has little
direct appeal to many voters, it is not that far removed from the concepts of choice,
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control and accountability that public understanding of science literature suggest are all
important in the public evaluation of science-based policy. In this case, the ‘natural logic’
of the argument seems to favour the anti-euro groups, as who could possibly argue against
the UK government retaining influence over the economic and monetary policies that
effect its citizens. As with the economic case, however, it quickly becomes apparent that
although the principle is clear enough, the institutional arrangements that will provide
control and allow for effective expression of national identity and interest are not beyond
dispute. A selection of these arguments is summarised in the Table 3.
Table 3: Political Arguments For and Against the Euro27
Political arguments for Political arguments against
Joining the euro protects sovereignty by giving the
UK more influence in the European monetary
policies that will effect our lives whether we are in
the euro or not.
Joining the euro will mean giving up sovereignty and
losing the ability to set monetary policies in the best
interest of the UK and its citizens
Joining the euro does not mean joining a superstate.
National differences in economic circumstances can
be dealt with through national economic policies.
There is no need, and no desire, for a superstate and,
even if such a plan was proposed, the UK could veto
it.
Joining the euro will mean becoming part of a
European superstate. This is inevitable because the
‘one size fits all’ interest rate needs a large federal
budget in order to make transfers between regions
that are experiencing different economic
circumstances.
Joining the euro will mean that the UK will have a
vote on all decisions and a powerful voice in
European economic and monetary policy decisions,
including those such as the Euro-12, from which it is
currently excluded.
Joining the euro will mean that economic and
monetary policy decisions are taken by European
Committees, staffed by people who are not
accountable to the UK electorate and who may not
have their interests in mind.
Joining the euro will have no serious effect on what
it means to be British: the monarchy, football and
the railways will all carry on just as before. The euro
merely provides a simpler way of paying for things.
Joining the euro will mean losing our distinctive
British identity by forcing us to give up traditional
institutions, measures and customs.
European regulations have done much to improve
the working conditions of people in the UK e.g.
giving them access to paternity leave, equal
opportunities and the working time directive.
European regulations will impose additional burdens
on UK government and industry making it
increasingly difficult for the UK to assert its
independence.
Joining the euro will have very little impact on fiscal
policies, as the UK will be able to veto changes it
does not approve of.
The euro is about economic and monetary union, so
joining means that we will inevitably have to have
similar fiscal policies to the rest of Europe.
So, just as with the economic arguments the political arguments are also finely balanced.
The same is true of other ideas that a referendum campaign might be orchestrated around.
For example, the idea of the ‘status quo’ might seem to favour the opponents of the euro,
as keeping the pound looks like keeping the status quo. The pro-euro groups would
counter, however, that the introduction of the single currency in January 2002 has
effectively changed the status quo so that european co-operation is the new normality.
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Thus, keeping the pound is not keeping the status quo, but moving outside the new
consensus of european and global politics. Thus, the pro-euro campaign is able to re-use
their 1975 slogan and argue that it is still ‘cold outside’.
Similar interpretative flexibility bedevils the more contemporary notion of ‘euro-creep’, by
which it is meant that support for the euro will creep up as UK citizens become more
familiar with it. In effect, doing nothing works well for the pro-euro groups as the danger
associated with the risk of the new recedes as the currency becomes increasingly
established. Perhaps surprisingly, anti-euro campaigners are also happy to wait for the
referendum. From their perspective, the continued success of the euro proves nothing as
long as it is accompanied by the continued economic success of the pound sterling. Thus,
euro-creep works for opponents of the euro, showing how nothing bad follows from the
decision to remain outside.
Citizen Opinion about the Euro
The euro referendum campaign obviously begins from a point where the participants in
the vote already have some ideas about it. The evidence from opinion polls is that, while
most people in the UK are sceptical about the euro, they have yet to take a firm view.
Thus, opinion polls usually show a majority of about 2:1 opposing entry to the euro if a
referendum were held soon, but the same polls also show that a similar proportion expect
the UK to adopt the euro in 5 or 10 years.28 Significantly, of those who do have a view
now, a large proportion admits that they know very little about the euro and that they
would be willing to change their mind.29
The referendum campaign is therefore one in which there is still much to play for. Only a
half of potential voters are sure of which way they will vote. The remaining half are open
to persuasion. What is more, it is this latter group of people, the very ones for whom
Europe is not an important issue, that will decide the referendum by adding their votes to
the already committed pro and anti lobbies. The paradox of extending participation
through a referendum about the single european currency is thus that:
For many people, Europe is of little interest or little impact and, as they see it, of
little threat to their own or their family’s security. Many are unlikely to have
thought about the single currency at all -- except perhaps briefly when changing
money at the airport before going abroad. While these voters may be most easily
influenced, they make up that part of the electorate which will have the most
influence on the final result.30
This is one of the interesting questions raised by the use of referenda to decide policy.
Although the democratic base is extended the intellectual dimensions of the debate may be
reduced to appeal to the ‘floating voters’. In effect, what appeals to them will determine
both the content of the campaign and the economic future of the UK. It is therefore
possible that, rather than ensuring the widest possible debate, resolving complex technical
issues through exclusively democratic methods means that only a limited debate is
possible, ironically replicating the one-sided messages about nuclear power and, possibly,
with the same consequences.
There is already some evidence that this is happening in the strategies of several of the
more high-profile campaign groups. As described in more detail below, both the pro- and
anti- euro groups believe that the presentation of issues must be driven by what voters are
interested in. As a result, the campaign groups expect to focus on emphasising concrete
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examples of tangible costs or benefits and to avoid abstract talk of general principles or
ideals, which are believed to turn off all but the most ardent policy ‘wonks’. The following
quotes, from a leading anti-euro group and a leading pro-euro group illustrate this
perspective clearly:
People are not interested in principled constitutional arguments … People want
the issue explained to them in terms of how it will affect their life, their job, their
mortgage, their pension, prices in the shops etc.31
We are trying to pitch arguments at a micro level; focusing on what is important to
people’s everyday lives. For example, in the euro you will get a better deal when
you buy a car but also you will get a better deal when you buy a CD or a pair of
jeans.32
Implied in this framing of the debate is an assumption that a key element of public opinion
on the euro is still largely malleable and unformed and that it can be swayed one way or
the other by arguments pitched in terms of their everyday experience. This still does not
resolve the problem for voters, however. Both pro- and anti- euro groups will argument
that individuals are best served by supporting their cause. As a result, the euro debate
continues to resemble a public science controversy. Neither science nor politics provides
any easy answers. There are no knockout blows or ‘slam dunk’ arguments. Nevertheless,
should a referendum be held, then a decision will have to be reached. This will necessarily
involve citizens taking a view about the credibility of different actors and of the arguments
they put forward. In effect, citizens must do individually, what the experts collectively
cannot – make a decision.33
Social Organisation of the Debate
If individuals are to evaluate these complex and competing arguments they are going to do
it without replicating the scientific and political research and argument that the experts and
activists in the campaign have undertaken. Doubtless some members of the population
will, for a variety of reasons, have taken the time and trouble to acquaint themselves with
the arguments, and to become experts in their own right. The majority will not, however,
and it is these people who will decide the outcome of the referendum, and who are the key
target for the campaign groups. The problem is that, because these arguments display all
the interpretative flexibility sociologists have come to associate with other scientific
controversies, some way of breaking into the regress of claim and counter-claim needs to
be found. In other words, just like scientists, voters will have to find some criteria outside
of what is normally considered to be science in order to make their choice between
competing claims about the nature of the social world.
In the scientific community, it is participation in the research work and informal
knowledge gained at conferences and through casual conversations that help close these
debates down by enabling judgements about trust and credibility to be made. The public
cannot achieve this level of participation in the relevant communities of experts, even
during a referendum campaign, as their access is almost certain to be mediated by
television or newspapers.34 Despite this, however, those who choose to vote will have to
some basis on which the claims made by economists and other advocates can be weighed,
evaluated and ultimately judged. In reality, most citizens are going to have to make a
judgement of trust about one side or the other and then use their vote to support a vision
of a social future that either includes or excludes the euro as the UK’s currency. The role
of the campaign groups is thus not to settle the dispute and achieve ‘closure’ in the
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scientific sense. Instead they must argue, agitate and lobby on behalf of one side or the
other in order to persuade as many people as possible that their interpretation of the data,
and their vision of the future, is the right one.
The social organisation of the campaign is thus crucial to winning the referendum. It is
through social groups and institutions ranging from the formal political parties and the
media to colleagues and friends that voters will gather the information and confidence they
need to take a view. In this context, the formally organised pro and anti euro campaign
groups will play an important role as they will be the principal providers of information
under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000,35 which lays down strict
guidelines on the participants in the referendum campaign. A key provision this Act is that
the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ campaigns must each have a single organising body, who will each
receive approximately £600,000 from the Electoral Commission and be allowed to spend
up to a maximum of £5 million on the campaign as a whole. In addition, established
political parties in House of Commons get a sum of money proportional to the number of
seats that they have. These groups – the designated Yes and No campaigns and the
political parties -- are the only organisations that will have significant campaign budgets
and be allowed to make campaign broadcasts. All other participants will be barred from
making campaign broadcasts and have a limit of £10,000 placed on their expenditure.36
Yes campaign
The campaign to build up support for pro-euro position is led by Britain in Europe.
Although one of the two umbrella organisations in the 1975 referendum, the group was
reinvigorated in October 1999 when it was re-launched as the official pro-Europe, pro-
euro campaign organisation by a cross-party group of politicians including: the Prime
Minister, Tony Blair; the Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, the leader of the
Liberal Democrats, Charles Kennedy; and senior figures from the previous Conservative
government such as former Chancellor of the Exchequer Ken Clarke and former Deputy
Prime Minister Michael Heseltine. The aim of the organisation is to:
promote public understanding of the importance to Britain of playing a leading
role in the European Union while explaining the benefits of joining a successful
single currency … And we seek to ensure the British people reject the views of
anti-Europeans who would undermine Britain's position in the European Union.37
Although the re-launch of Britain in Europe in 1999 was promoted by senior political
figures from the major UK political parties, they claim that these figures represented:
only the tip of the iceberg because behind that was the coalition of top business
people and leading trade unionists and representatives from civil society and so on
and so forth. What we have done, as it were, building the pyramid downwards, is
now build coalitions that are similar in terms of having all parties in business and
trade unions and civil society at regional and local level, bottomed out by, now tens
of thousands of ordinary people at grass roots level.38
Given this level of backing it is unsurprising that Britain in Europe is the recognised leader
of the pro-euro campaign in the UK.39 Evidence for this status as lead organisation in the
campaign can be seen both in the range of organisations that have signed up to support it
and in the limited number of alternative pro-euro campaign groups. As shown in the table
below, the number of web sites advocating a pro-euro position is small, suggesting that, to
the extent any pro-euro campaign exists, it is centralised with only limited networking
between different groups.
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Table 4: Pro-Euro Websites and their Networks
Group Name Links from Links to
Britain in Europe 0 5
The European Movement 2 4
Pro Euro Conservative Party 0 3
Euro Information Network 0 2
Yes Campaign 5 2
The Federal Trust 2 2
Citizens for Europe 5 1
Young European Movement 2 1
Confederation of British Industry40 0 1
Trade Union Congress41 1 0
1 Europe Pro-Euro Mailing List 4 0
Association for the Monetary Union of Europe 2 0
The City in Europe 0 0
Union of European Federalists 0 0
With some security in its role as the designated representative in any referendum, Britain in
Europe group is fully engaged in preparing for that role. This work focuses on three parallel
streams of activity. The first of these is the academic and other research that is needed to
develop the arguments and evidence that can be used to counter the critiques of the
opposition and justify the claim the joining the euro is in Britain’s best interest. The
organisation has produced a wide range of these publications, addressing everything from
the anti-European myths to the economic case for the euro. This work is being
disseminated through its links with organisations such as the TUC and seminars and other
events in which information about the euro is made available to local organisations and
individuals. In addition, the research is also made available to the public more generally in
public through pamphlets and booklets and from their website. This research is not
expected to feature prominently in campaign as a whole, however. Rather the aim of the
work is to provide context and resources for ‘opinion formers’ in the media and elsewhere
to use in framing their views:
On an issue such as the euro people are looking for leadership from sources they
trust, so some effort has been made to try to identify people who are influential to
a certain group of people, such as a union official to their members and so on. We
need to arm pro-Europeans with enough information to rebut the myths about the
euro that will inevitably be put into circulation during a campaign and to get the
facts about the euro over to the public from sources they trust.42
The second range of activities is direct campaigning in readiness for the referendum.
Given that there is no definite commitment to a referendum as yet, these campaigns are
opportunistic and aimed at keeping positive messages about the euro in the public domain.
This may be done through press releases that emphasise positive aspects of Europe and
the single european currency, but posters, campaigns and leaflets aimed at the wider public
are also important. Although not part of the official referendum campaign, these publicity
drives do provide some insight into the issues that are expected to matter in any
referendum campaign. For example, the national poster campaign launched in January
2002 to coincide with the launch of euro notes and coins used the slogan ‘Jan 1st: Britain
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misses the boat’ to echo the 1975 campaign theme of ‘It’s cold outside’ and emphasise
how Britain was being left behind by Europe. In a similar way, direct campaigning in
February took advantage of St Valentines Day to promote price transparency and the
extent to which goods such as champagne, perfumes and chocolates are all cheaper in
Europe.
The third set of activities are probably the most important in terms of any eventual
referendum campaign. These activities are the ones that focus on building the local
credibility and trust needed to gain the votes necessary to win the referendum. They centre
on the local organisations that Britain in Europe has established across the country so
campaign messages can be presented at national, regional and local levels. At the national
level, the Britain in Europe campaign see themselves as having a significant advantage,
with backing from high profile and popular politicians from across the political spectrum.
Their position can be summed up as follows:
In this non-ideological age, it is clear that most voters in general elections focus on
which of the parties (and leaders) offer the best prospect of future financial well
being for them and their families. The referendum will be no different, except that
voters will feel less certain of their own ability to judge the case for themselves and
thus more reliant on their estimation of the calibre of the proponents on each side.
Here the pro-[euro] camp will have an enormous advantage. Almost every
politician and business leader they [i.e. the voters] rate will be ranged on the side of
joining and the ‘starry-eyed’ brigade will be advising against. It is quite difficult to
entrust your life savings to John Redwood and his friends, rather than to Gordon
Brown. This would take a degree of blind bigotry that, happily, not many possess.43
In contrast, the No campaign is seen as having relatively few of these political
‘heavyweights’, and thus vulnerable to the same kind of campaign that proved to be
effective in 1975 when the opponents of the Common Market were demonised as the
‘men with the staring eyes’.44 Similar attempts to reduce the credibility of the opponents of
the euro can be seen in recent campaigns emphasising predictions that the euro would
never be launched and characterising their opponents as ‘the usual suspects’.45
But political campaigns cannot be fought at the national level alone. It is important for
both sides to ‘get the vote out’, and it is here that the Yes campaign might seem to be at a
disadvantage. For example, one thing that the absence of web sites reflecting a pro-euro
perspective might be taken to represent is a lack of such support in the wider society. This
would certainly be consistent with the opinion poll evidence for the support for the euro.
In addition, other polls have found that political and business groups are not particularly
trusted, suggesting further problems for the pro-euro groups. Whether or not this is true
remains to be seen, but it is the case that the Britain in Europe campaign is working to
establish a network of local organisations through which the door-to-door and face-to-face
aspects of the campaign can be conducted. In this way, the structure of the process, as a
national political debate, shapes both the content and the conduct of the debate as the
campaign groups start to mirror the social organisation found in traditional social
movements or national political parties.
By building up campaigning capacity the Britain in Europe group is building the mechanism
through which the regress of claim and counter-claim can be broken by direct contact with
people that share similar experiences and concerns. Thus, despite the position papers and
other resources available via the web site and other channels, the key to the campaign is
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seen as residing in local people arguing that the euro will be beneficial for them in their
local context:
The major thrust of our activity over the past two years has been to build a
network and infrastructure able to take the weight of any referendum campaign.
When the campaign kicks off and the public has begun to listen seriously to
arguments from both pro- and anti- Europeans we will have people in place who,
at every level, are the natural leaders of the moderate mainstream majority.46
Anti-euro campaign groups
The social organisation of the opposition to the euro differs from to the pro-euro groups.
The key difference is that the wide range of active anti-euro groups has no single umbrella
organisation that unites them. Instead, the anti-euro groups remain a set of loosely
networked groups, each with their own agenda, organisation and resources, and thus in
conflict with the Referendum Act, which requires a single organisation to represent the
anti-euro position.47 A summary of some of these groups is given in the table below,
which lists 10 anti-euro group with web sites that are linked to the most:48
Table 5: Anti-Euro Websites and their Networks
Group Name Links from Links to
Democracy Movement 27 17
Campaign for Independent Britain 32 16
UK Independence Party 14 16
Labour European Safeguards Campaign 2 15
Business for Sterling 0 14
New Europe 0 13
Eurocritic 0 12
Global Britain 17 12
Youth for Free Europe 18 12
Bruges Group 0 11
Congress for Democracy 0 11
Two things are immediately obvious from the table. The first is that there are far more
anti-euro web sites than there are pro-euro web sites. The second is that the majority of
organisations that have developed web sites would be classed as anti-Europe, or pro-
independence, rather than anti-euro. Although these views may be muted in the context of
a referendum campaign, the table does suggest that, whatever the opinion poll evidence
about the public’s concerns, those actively involved in the debate think that sovereignty is
important. For example, the four most linked-to sites are all organisations that would see
themselves as fighting on a much broader agenda than ‘keeping the pound’. They are:
 the Democracy Movement, which describes itself as ‘Britain's largest all-party grass roots
campaign to keep the pound’ and was founded in January 1999 through the merger of
the Referendum Movement (formerly Sir James Goldsmith’s Referendum Party) and Paul
Syke’s Euro Information Campaign. Both these organisations were committed not just to
opposing the single european currency but to ending UK membership of the
European Union through ‘restor[ing] Britain’s status as a self governing democracy’.49
 the Campaign for an Independent Britain, founded in 1976 as the Safeguard Britain Campaign,
although its name was changed to the British Anti-Common Market Campaign in 1983
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before the current name was adopted in 1989. As its name suggests, the Campaign for an
Independent Britain ‘seeks the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 under
which EU directives take precedence over UK law [so that] the United Kingdom
would be free, as an independent state, to co-operate and trade with its neighbours in
Europe and with countries elsewhere in the world without the restrictions imposed by
EU membership.’50
 UK Independence Party, which was founded by Dr. Alan Sked in 1993 as a political party
committed to bringing about the ‘U.K.’s withdrawal from the European Union to
regain control of the nation’s affairs through Parliament at Westminster’.51
 Labour European Safeguards Campaign, chaired by Austin Mitchell MP, and opposed to
EU membership as well as the single currency. It also co-operates with the Campaign for
an Independent Britain in producing campaign material aimed at Labour party members.52
Another implication of the table is that nominating one group as the ‘designated’
representative of the anti-euro position is complicated by the fact that many of the existing
organisations, and particularly the better resourced and networked ones, are based in the
existing political parties. As a result, they are unlikely candidates for the official ‘anti-euro’
campaign group, because any such group will, in practice, have to be both a cross-party
organisation capable of providing an umbrella under which a the rest of the groups can
unite.
From this perspective the next two organisations listed in the table are particularly
interesting. Business for Sterling and New Europe represent two such cross-party/non-party
organisations that are able claim a national membership and which have officially joined
forces to form the ‘Europe Yes, Euro No’ campaign. Often shortened to No,53 the
organisation was officially launched on 4 Sept 200054, though the two groups had been
collaborating before this. Of the two partners in No, Business for Sterling was launched in
June 1998 under the leadership of Lord Marsh,55 and with the public support of over 100
business leaders.56 According to Business for Sterling the case for opposing monetary union
needed to be made on two fronts. Firstly, there was a need to counter ‘the myth that the
great majority of the business community favours early UK membership.’57 Secondly,
there was a need to explain how the UK’s prosperity would suffer if it chose to join.
Significantly, the Business for Sterling group was not against the UK’s participation in other
areas of European policy, particularly the single market. Instead they emphasised the
uncertainty that surrounded the economics of integration and their belief that joining
would bring European style regulations that increase taxes and cost jobs.
The second partner in No is New Europe. Unlike Business for Sterling, which has now
removed its web presence so that all links are now redirected to the shared No site, New
Europe retains a separate presence and organisation. New Europe is also more broadly based
than Business for Sterling, drawing support from political, economic communities as well as
business. For example, at its launch in March 1999, the key figures identified with the
group included Lord Owen, its founder and a former Labour foreign secretary, Lord Prior,
a cabinet minister under Margaret Thatcher, Lord Healey, a former Chancellor of the
Exchequer under James Callaghan, Barclays Bank chief executive Martin Taylor, and
Roger Bootle, an economist and former member of Panel of Independent Forecasters.58
Like Business for Sterling, New Europe is founded on the basis of opposition to the single
currency rather than the European Union. The New Europe vision is not, therefore, one
that sees the UK disengaging from Europe. Instead they:
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… believe that Britain should remain a self-governing nation within the European
Union. We are committed to the UK's continued and constructive membership of
an EU that values the individual contributions and identities of its member states
and respects the desire of those who want to govern themselves. We welcome
progressive enlargement to 30 plus nations, further progress on achieving a full
single market and, where sensible, as in environmental policy, more decisions taken
at EU level.59
By joining together under the umbrella of No, these two organisations represent a
potentially powerful combination of business, political and citizen expertise. What is more,
their national organisation and secure funding provides a structure that supports a network
of local and regional organisations through which their campaigns can be run. In some
ways the Britain in Europe and No campaigns are very similar, with both recognising the
importance of local and regional issues for voters in the referendum. There are some
differences in approach, however. The No campaign is a less grassroots organisation and
conducts its regional campaigns in slightly different way, it claims, to Britain in Europe:
It’s not so much like grassroots campaign delivering leaflets, but you do need to
have a regional media operation, be it a regional TV or a regional radio …
Everything we do as a regional angle … The one slight difference in the regional
operations is they [Britain in Europe] use the European movement to do a lot of
local letter writing and stuff … We focus more on having a regional event, some
media event, it might be having one of our posters on a bill board, or a van, that
kind of thing and you having a couple of local business people pictured in front of
it.60
This social organisation also has implications for the conduct of any referendum campaign
and for the emphasis given to the political and economic arguments if an organisation
such as No were to become the designated representative of the anti-euro groups. For
example, No generally believes that economic arguments will the most effective in
persuading people to oppose the euro, and that sovereignty issues will be less salient for
most voters.
We don’t really ever use the language of sovereignty and so on, partly because
when we’ve done [focus] groups, you find the people don’t understand what you’re
talking about. Sovereignty is a way that politicians express something which
doesn’t really resonate the public. If you’re talking about very simply issues of
having good control of how your economies work, having control of taxes, public
spending and the macro management in the economy, then that is what works,
rather than going on about some abstraction like sovereignty … People always say
in focus groups, I just want to know what it’s going to mean to me. So our
campaign, in any referendum, if there was one, would definitely be all about that.61
This position has several pragmatic advantages. For example, it provides the widest
possible base from which to oppose the euro, whilst also providing a way out of the
credibility gap that might exist between the leading political figures that head the pro and
anti euro campaigns. By focussing on the economic arguments, the role of business leaders
as experts is highlighted and their social position as interested in making money turned
into an advantage: business opposes the euro because it is bad for business and hence
employment.
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Until the referendum campaign is called, however, there is not a single anti-euro voice and
some of the other groups would dispute the analysis provided by No. Thus, although No
appears to be working on the assumption that it will become the designated representative
of the anti-euro campaign, this is not yet a fait accompli. In particular, the Congress for
Democracy, another cross-party umbrella organisation that includes many of the
organisations listed in the table on its Agenda Committee, rejects the idea that sovereignty
is not a salient issue:
the F word [federalism] just can’t be ignored. The Yes campaign will have take that
one on, that we are talking about a federal state in Europe. And I think they’ll have
to come out and say that it is worth it.  We’ve had this strange paradox, that
whereas on continent of Europe up until now, it’s been the case that they have
seen it as a political objective for which there is an economic price. We in Britain
have, in the past, tended to see it as an economic objective for which there was a
political price. And I think that, in a sense, the argument will shift much more onto
the continental vision where the objectives are political, and you either agree with
the political objectives or not. And the Yes campaign will agree with those
objectives and will have to come out much more clearly about this. And if you
don’t agree with the political objectives, then you will be against the whole
concept, and I think that’s where the argument will focus on.62
For this position to gain weight in any referendum, then it will need to be promoted by the
designated anti-euro organisation, or the various groups that can unite under its umbrella.
If this No take a leading role, then it is difficult to see how this can happen as its position
and strategy is to focus on the economics and not the politics. One obvious alternative is
that the Congress itself could apply to the Electoral Commission to be the designated
representative of the anti-euro group. This option, and the role the Congress could play in
any referendum campaign, was discussed at a meeting held in March 2002 where the
keynote speeches focussed on two issues. Firstly, there was the question of whether or not
Congress should apply to be the designated representative of the anti-euro campaign and,
secondly, how those organisations that oppose membership of the European Union, and
not just the euro, should position themselves in any referendum campaign.
The minutes of the Congress meeting63 reveal how complex this issue becomes when
decisions become part of a democratic process. On the one hand, there was strong
support amongst the Agenda Committee for a motion proposing that the Congress should
apply to the Electoral Commission to be the official representative of the anti-euro side.
Of the sixteen organisations consulted, fourteen supported the motion, with only New
Europe and Business for Sterling, the founder members of No, opposed to the motion. Of the
fourteen that supported the motion, two had proposed a consultation with No before any
motion was discussed, but, as the Chair of the Congress reported, this had been tried and it
had ‘not been possible to reach an agreement’64. Although this may seem to provide an
endorsement of the motion, this was not the tone taken in most of the speeches. There
were practical issues associated with running an effective campaign, and on this front, Sir
Michael had to tell the Congress that, despite the support for the motion:
The Congress does not, at present, have the resources to set up a campaign of its
own.65
In effect, participants in the referendum must have resources prior to the launch of the
official campaign in order to create the social infrastructure needed to persuade voters to
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support them. Whilst it is possible that co-operation between the different members of the
Congress might get around some of these problems, the challenges facing them are more
than just financial. There is also the question of how the arguments on which the
campaign against the euro should be fought.
As noted above, the No approach is to accept, and even celebrate, membership of the
European Union while opposing the adoption of the single currency. Whilst this fits well
with what is known about public opinion, it is rather different from the views of many of
the other organisations that make up the Congress. As shown in the table, many anti-euro
organisations place their views in the context of UK independence, and thus tend to see
the euro a part of a much wider process in which national sovereignty is gradually being
ceded to Europe. Given this, one might expect that the Congress would favour a campaign
that gives much more attention to the European dimension of the euro. This preference
was made clear by Austin Mitchell as he explained why no agreement was reached with No
(whilst also emphasising the importance of social networks in making the case):
Michael Spicer and I went to see Business for Sterling and, it is fair to say, we were
not able to move them. I do not think their position of ‘Europe Yes, Euro No’ is
going to be broadly representative of the organisations and groups opposed to the
euro … LESC [Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign] would like discussion to
continue to establish the umbrella. We do not think Business for Sterling has the
political nous, experience and the feet on the ground or on the pavement that
other organisations can provide. We want a broader common ground than Business
for Sterling is prepared to take.66
Similar sentiments were expressed by Christopher Gill, the Chairman of the Freedom
Association, who made clear the link between the euro and Europe:
I would simply urge all the delegates here today to try to avoid falling into the trap
of using the language of the integrationists, which is to talk about the euro, as
opposed to what it really is, the implementation of economic and monetary union.
Of course it follows that if you adopt the single currency, therefore economic and
monetary union, you are almost inevitably bound to accept the political union that
therefore follows. And that is why we have some reservations about the slogan
that the ‘No’ campaign are promoting, which says ‘Europe Yes, Euro No’.67
Surprisingly, this view was not shared by all the keynote speakers, with others appearing to
accept that No would be the designated organisation and that, even if it wasn’t, the
referendum would probably end up being fought under something like their banner
anyway. In staking out the intellectual ground on which the referendum would have to be
fought, the tension between what the speakers believed was correct and what they believed
the public would accept, was clearly a significant concern.
The problem for anti-Europeans is the gap between their opinions and those held by the
public, which are generally pro-pound rather than anti-Europe. As other speakers made
clear, this difference plays into the hands of the pro-euro groups, forcing the opponents of
the euro to try and minimise the emphasis given to any anti-European sentiments or risk
alienating the very people they seek to persuade. As Russell Walters, the Director of the
Democracy Movement put it:
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Linking the two positions of keeping the pound and getting out of the EU will for
a start fragment our support in the country. It will alienate groups and voters who,
although, pro-pound at this stage, also want, perhaps naively, Britain to stay in the
EU. Among the electorate these people are the overwhelming majority, whether
we like it or not.68
Similarly, Lord Pearson of Rannoch, the Co-Founder of Global Britain, and staunch
advocate of the view that the UK should leave the EU, argued that a pragmatic approach
was essential:
We come-outers are going to vote No anyway. That must be obvious, but it is
worth remembering. And so the official campaign, whatever it is, is really going to
have to reach as far as possible to those who think they like the European Union
but who can be persuaded to vote No … So I believe that the elements of this
Congress which are not committed publicly to come-outery should probably join up
with Business for Sterling and New Europe … And I do believe, I am afraid, that the
reality is that Business for Sterling is the best place to organise this campaign. I think
it is probably better organised than any other conglomeration here of us here,
especially if we are ‘tainted’ with come-outery.69
Even Austin Michell appeared to concede the point, as he argued for the importance of
the designated organisation presenting a united front:
It [the designated anti-euro campaign] must not argue about side issues such as
corpus juris, in or out, or about the irritations which have accumulated over the
years in our relationship with Europe. All these other things are going to
complicate what is a single issue and a simple campaign, yes or no to the euro.70
The outcome is thus that, although, the Congress believes that it is has a role to play in the
campaign, the extent to which they can define the agenda and the issues is limited by their
perception of what public opinion can accept. In other words, although many of these
groups would count as experts on European law, institutions and legislation this expertise
seems set to be excluded from the referendum campaign at their own request. In contrast,
the pragmatic ‘Europe Yes, Euro No’ position, which many of the same groups do not
truly believe, seems set to become the one that orchestrates the campaign because the
alternative would be to risk losing the referendum. And that would be even worse.
Conclusion
The debate about the single european currency and, in particular, the preparations for the
referendum campaign provide a useful focus for examining how decisions that incorporate
complex scientific assessment and advice are taken in a context that is fully politicised.
Although the post-hoc nature of a referendum might be criticised for not fully engaging
publics at an early stage, it is definitely a more participatory and democratic way of taking
the decision than expert committees. Like court cases in which forensic and other sciences
are on trial, the referendum has the potential to be an engine of deconstruction. The
difference is that in a referendum the jury is the whole population.
Widening participation is usually taken to be an improvement on elite or expert decision-
making processes. It encourages trust and allows claims made by expert groups to be
evaluated by citizens from outside the policy elite. The social commitments and
assumptions of scientists and other experts can be revealed, and the boundaries between
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what is known and what is being assumed are highlighted. In the case of the euro, as in so
many other scientific domains from nuclear power to BSE, these boundaries matter
because most knowledge-claims remain contested, so that what is known with any
certainty is rather limited. In such a setting, the idea of a more participatory process, in
which democratic legitimacy adds to what can only be minimal scientific authority, seems
like a sensible proposal.
Moreover, such an approach fits well with developments in social theory. The idea of the
risk society is becoming commonplace, but the extent to which the institutions of reflexive
modernisation are emerging remains an empirical question. By examining the debate about
the single currency, some answers to this question can be outlined and some warnings
raised about an uncritical reliance on increased participation as a route to better decision-
making. In particular, the preparations for the euro debate raise two issues that might
undermine the credibility of such decision-making mechanisms.
The first concern is that, despite the participatory nature of the referendum, the conduct
of the campaign seems to remain a relatively centralised and elite activity determined by
access to capital and resources rather than on the basis expertise or commitment. Thus,
anti-euro campaign seems likely to be dominated by No, not because its position
represents in any democratic sense the views of most of those opposed to the euro, but
because it is backed by Business for Sterling and thus has the necessary resources. A similar
position seems to have emerged in the pro-euro camp, although here the identification of
Britain in Europe, which has a similar pro-Europe, pro-business orientation, as the
designated representative seems less controversial. There is therefore the distinct
possibility that, rather than promoting reflexive debate about policy and politics in a global
context, the referendum will further entrench a narrow economic rationality as the only
legitimate discourse.
The extent to which this happens in practice depends on the level of control the
designated organisations are able to exert over the presentation of the campaign. The
preparations underway so far indicate a clear preference to orchestrate the campaign
around this economic agenda and to minimise the profile of sovereignty and British
independence in the campaign. In effect, perceptions of a public opinion that
acknowledges itself as being uninformed are being allowed to set the referendum
campaign agenda. Of course, it might not turn out this way. Although the designation of
No as the official anti-euro campaign would give priority to this view, provision under the
2000 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act for other permitted participants and
political parties to produce campaign material of their own would not preclude these ideas
entering into the public debate. The anti-euro groups outside the designated umbrella
organisation may yet launch a guerrilla campaign, in which local activists seek to force the
debate back onto an agenda of sovereignty and independence, even if this is not the
position of the designated anti-euro group. Whether this happens cannot be known until
the referendum campaign takes place, but the history of attempts to control public
discourse from the centre suggests that silencing all the anti-European groups will be, to
say the least, very difficult.
How the referendum campaign is actually conducted cannot be predicted, but the
evidence so far suggests that the groups who anticipate participating in it are being led by
public opinion rather than leading it. Whilst this will clearly be effective for one side or the
other, it is not clear how such a process either ensures a critical examination of the claims
made or enhances the capacity of citizens to engage with controversial science. Indeed, if
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something like the full range of arguments is articulated in the public domain, then, on the
present evidence, this will be despite the referendum and not because of it.
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